Seminários Preliminares / Preliminar Seminars
Seminários Preliminares / Preliminar Seminars
Como preparação para o 4eC&L e 2ºQuDays, serão realizados seminários preliminares dedicados a questões centrais da metafísica contemporânea e suas relações com a física quântica. A proposta é promover uma aproximação conceitual aos temas que atravessarão o encontro, estimulando o diálogo entre filosofia, física e outras áreas do conhecimento.
As a preparation for the 4eC&L and 2nd QuDays, preliminary seminars will be held focusing on central questions in contemporary metaphysics and their connections with quantum physics. The aim is to provide a conceptual introduction to the themes that will shape the event, fostering dialogue between philosophy, physics, and other areas of knowledge.
Emma Jaura é pesquisadora de pós-doutorado na Universidade de Oxford e integra o Quantum Worldviews Project, projeto interdisciplinar que reúne filósofos, teólogos e físicos. Sua pesquisa concentra-se em temas metafísicos, especialmente fundamentação e dependência, com foco no coerentismo metafísico e em concepções da realidade como uma rede de relações interdependentes. Investiga também possíveis contribuições da tradição budista e de interpretações da física quântica para essa abordagem.
Emma Jaura is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford and a member of the Quantum Worldviews Project, an interdisciplinary project bringing together philosophers, theologians, and physicists. Her research focuses on metaphysical topics, particularly fundamentality and dependence, with an emphasis on metaphysical coherentism and conceptions of reality as an interdependent web of relations. She also explores how the Buddhist tradition and interpretations of quantum physics may support this approach.
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Metaphysical Coherentism, Buddhist Interdependence, and Relational Quantum Mechanics’
Abstract: Metaphysical coherentism is an underexplored alternative to traditional foundationalism which (a) rejects any commitment to ontologically independent, fundamental foundations, and (b) embraces the possibility of symmetrical ontological dependence. Coherentism has received relatively little attention from analytic metaphysicians, with some notable recent exceptions. I argue that it is more often considered as a serious metaphysical thesis across various Indian and Chinese Buddhist schools. My first aim is to show how recent work on coherentism and its variations (drawing predominantly from Swiderski (2024)) can be used to interpret variations of emptiness and pictures of interdependence found in different schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Following a similar sentiment to Kang (2025), I hope to show that tools from contemporary analytic metaphysics and ideas from classical Buddhist philosophy can complement each other, illuminating murky details around universal questions to do with dependence and fundamentality. I then move on to sketching a picture of metaphysical coherentism as an ontology for Rovelli’s (1996) relational quantum mechanics. I have argued previously (Jaura, 2024) that the most appropriate metaphysical framework for capturing RQM is one that lacks fundamentalia, and accepts symmetrical dependence, making coherentism a good contender. Given this, I can reach my ultimate aim of supporting comparisons between the metaphysics of Mahayana Buddhist schools, and the ontology of relational quantum mechanics, using the framework of metaphysical coherentism. Such a picture that can capture the major commitments of each, involves a vast network of interdependence, within which all entities rely on (some or all) others for their existence of nature. By demonstrating that this kind of metaphysical picture can receive support from both Buddhist metaphysics as well as contemporary physics, I conclude that metaphysical coherentism is worthy of further investigation.
Università della Svizzera Italiana (USI), Switzerland
https://cristianmariani.weebly.com/
11/11/26 às 10h (GMT-3)
Cristian Mariani é pesquisador no Istituto di Studi Filosofici (USI), em Lugano, Suíça, onde coordena atualmente o projeto Quantum Indeterminacy: A Metaphysics for Spontaneous Collapse Models of Quantum Mechanics, financiado pelo SNF Ambizione Grant. Sua pesquisa concentra-se em metafísica analítica e filosofia da ciência, especialmente nas relações entre essas áreas. Seus principais interesses incluem indeterminação metafísica aplicada à física quântica, filosofia do tempo, metafísica da ciência (leis, causalidade e emergência) e fundamentos da mecânica quântica.
Cristian Mariani is a Research Fellow at the Istituto di Studi Filosofici (USI) in Lugano, Switzerland, where he currently leads the project Quantum Indeterminacy: A Metaphysics for Spontaneous Collapse Models of Quantum Mechanics, funded by an SNF Ambizione Grant. His research focuses on analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science, particularly on the interactions between these fields. His main interests include metaphysical indeterminacy applied to quantum physics, philosophy of time, metaphysics of science (laws, causation, and emergence), and the foundations of quantum mechanics.
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Two Kinds of Determinism
Abstract: Physicists often speak as though determinism and determinacy were the same issue, yet the two questions are conceptually distinct. Determinism concerns the dynamics of a physical system: given its complete state at a time, is there exactly one way it can evolve, or can history fork into multiple possible futures? Determinacy, by contrast, concerns the ontology of the system at a time: does each of its properties have a single, sharp value, or can properties be irreducibly "fuzzy"? Standard characterizations of determinism (following Hoefer, Reichenbach, Peirce, and Glymour) require a "specified way things are" at a time, and this specification can be read either maximally—covering every physical quantity—or as requiring that quantities take determinate values. On this reading, determinism simply presupposes determinacy: without sharp values, the notion of a uniquely fixed future becomes unintelligible. Earman resists this, arguing that determinism can be formulated over set- or interval-valued magnitudes, so that determinacy is not strictly required. Examining Bohmian mechanics as a test case—where positions are always determinate and the guiding equation deterministic—suggests that in the theories we actually have, determinism and determinacy travel together, even if it remains unclear what a "minimal amount of determinateness" short of full determinacy could mean. The tentative conclusion is that, contrary to the received view, determinism and determinacy are not straightforwardly independent notions once we look past their conceptual definitions to the physical theories in which they are embedded.